From The Law and Theory of Trade Secrecy: A Handbook of
Contemporary Research, edited by Rochelle C. Dreyfuss and
Katherine J. Strandburg, Edward Elgar (2011)

8 How trade secrecy law generates a natural
semicommons of innovative know-how
Jerome H. Reichman*

It is both disappointing and exhilarating to re-examine the functions

of trade secrecy law for this volume. The disappoilltment stems from
encountering many of the same old questions that Reichman, Samuelson
and Scotchmer have addressed over a 20-year period. l The exhilaration
comes from rereading that brilliant article by Samuelson and Scotchmer
on reverse engineering at some distance, and realizing how many questions
these collective efforts managed to answer. So let me try to set the record
straight in a few short pages, beginning with the question of whether or
not it is better to treat trade secrecy law as a form of intellectual property
law rather than as a business tort under unfair competition law. 2

I.

TRADE SECRETS AS A FORM OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

The logical point of departure is to observe that 'intellectual property' has
never been just about exclusive rights in intangible, non-rivalrous creations. It has always included conduct-based liability rules found in some
sui generis regimes, as well as absolute liability rules that confer only a
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1 I.H. Reichman, Charting the Collapse of the Patent-Copyright Dichotomy:
Premises for a Restructured International Intellectual Property System, 13 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 475, 504-17 (1995); J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the
Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2504-57 (1994); Pamela
Samuelson and Susan Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering,
888 YALE L.J. 1575 (2002).
2
Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as
Intellectual Property Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 315~53 (2008) (discussing
the origins of trade secrecy law in torts, then constructing an IP theory of trade
secrets); see also Gustavo Ghidini and Valeria Falce, Chapter 6.
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'license of right' yielding reasonable royalties, as occurs with mechanical recordings under copyright law and, in most countries, with public
performances of sound recordings under neighborIng rigl)ts Jaws. 3 All of
these are 'intelleCtual property', which the classical tradition subdivides
into 'industrial property' and 'literary and artistic property' (including
neighboring rights laws).4
Formally, when international intellectual property law first recognized
trade secrets under Article 39 of the TRIPS Agreement, the drafters
deliberately inserted it into Article I Obis of the Paris Convention, whictt
regulates unfair competition norms as a subset of industrial property law. 5
The purpose of this move was to emphasize that Article 39 of the TRIPS
Agreement had, in and of itself, not created any exclusive rights. Rather, it
had recognized trade secret protection as a specification of the obligations
to avoid unfair competition in international trade already set out in the
Paris Convention. Unfortunately, the drafters of Article 39, which tracked
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) in the United States,6 failed
expressly to mention lawful reverse engineering. Yet, the understanding
that reverse engineering is privileged perfects and operationalizes trade
secret protection in the United States; its very purpose is to generate more
innovation than would otherwise occur. 7
If we think of intellectual property rights only as comprising exclusive
rights, labeling trade secrets as 'intellectual property' deforms the entire
history of trade secrecy law. But if we broaden our understanding of
intellectual property to include all forms of property rights in intangible,
non-rivalrous creations, including ex ante and ex post liability rules, then
3
See 17 U.S.c. §115 (2006); International Convention for '(he Proiectionof
Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, Rome,
-Italy, October 26, 1961,496 V.N.T.S. 43 (,Rome Convention'), Art. 12.
4
See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
September 9, 1886, as last revised at Paris, July 24, 1971, 828 V.N.T.S. 221
(,Berne Convention')~ Arts. I, 2; Paris Convention for the Protection ofIndustrial
Prqperty, March 29, 1&83, as revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, V.S.T. 1583
('Paris ConveI1tjon'), Art. 1(1), (3); Rome Conyen.tion, Arts. 4-6.
5
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April
15,1994,33 l.L.M. 81 (1994) (,TRIPS Agreement'), Art. 39.1; Paris Convention,
Art. 10bis. See generally Jerome H. Reichman, Rethinking the Role of Clinical
,Trial Data in International Intellectual Property Law: The Case for a Public Goods
Approach, 13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. I, 17-22 (2009).
6
Compare Vniform Trade Secrets Act, §1(2) 14V.L.A. 438 (1985) with
TRIPS Agreement, Art. 39.2.
7
See generally Samuelson and Scotchmer, supra note I; RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS §43 (1995) ('Independent discovery and analysis of publicly available
products or information are not improper means of acquisition') .
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we may say that there is a property right in trade secrets in the form of an
entitlement to either lead time or compensation for ~ost lead time due to a
wrongful appropriation. While there mayor may not be an injunction to
enforce that entitlement, the cOPlpensation is properly measured only in
terms of the loss of lead time that it would have taken a routine engineer
to reverse engineer the trade secret by honest means.
The modality of enforcement via an injunction in such cases does not
convert trade secrecy law into a regime of exclusive property rights. It
remains a conduct-based liability rule, but no less a property right, in the
sense of an ex ante entitlement. It is, however, a peculiar property right, in
that a third party's reverse engineering by -honest means will truncate its
existence without more. As the late Professor John C.,Stedman accurately
observed ll} 1962, it is 'a disappearing property right', unlike any other in
that respect. 8
'
It follows that treating trade secrets as an 'intellectual property right'
does little in ~tselfto advance our understanding. We must push on to consider what exactly trade secrecy law protects, and what its true normative
function really is.

II.

TRADE SECRECY LAW PROTECTS
INVESTMENT IN INNOVATION AS SUCH

Viewed as a subset of intellectual property law, the distinctive characteristic
of trade secrecy law is that itprotects investment in innovation as such. Until
the 1990s, when Switzerland tried to codify a misappropriation law for this
very purpose (as Owen Paepke long ago desired),9 this distinctive aspect
of trade secrecy law was virtually unique. IO By their nature, virtually all
other so-called intellectual property rights (disregarding trademarks and
th~ like) provideexclu_sive, non~exclusive or semi-exclusive rights to some
predefined product of intellectual creativity, such as 'inventions' in :patent

See John C. Stedman, Trade Secrets, 23 OHIO STATE L.J. 4, 8 (1962).
See F,ederal Law on Unfair Competition of December 1986, art. 5(c) (effective March 1', 1988) (Switz); Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 1, at 2474-6;
C. Owen Paepke, An Economic Interpretation of the Misappropriation Doctrine:
Common Law Protection for Investments in Innovation, 2 HIGH TECH. LJ. 65
(1987); see also Douglas Gary Lichtman, The Economics of Innovation: Protecting
Unpatentable Goods, 81 MINN. L. REV. 693 (1997).
10
But see Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 1, at 2477-8 (describing the
protection of construction project designs by means of an ex ante liability rule
under art. 99 of the Italian Copyright Law).
8
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law, 'literary and artistic works' in copyright law, 'ornamental designs'
(appearance designs) ih design protection laws, or 'distinctive varieties' in
plant variety protection law. ll These intellectual property rights, in turn,
typically depend on the attainment of a specified level of creativity, as
manifested in a specified type of intellectual creation, which will last for a
specified period of time. The end result is to enable the creator to recoup
his or her investment and turn a profit in the intangible, non-rivalrous
creation, which might otherwise be duplicated rapidly (despite potentially
high front-end costs, including R&D costs, where applicable) and disseminated at relatively low marginal costs of reproduction.
As Stephen Ladas once explained, what trade secrecy law protects is
an entrepreneur's investment in applications of know-how to industry,
which mayor may not rise to the level of a non-obvious invention. I2 In
this context:
know-how consists of information about how to achieve some technical or
commercial advantage ove,r competitors, typically by means of novel methods
or processes of production. Such information mayor may not be secret. If
secret, it may be held only under actual, but not legal, secrecy, which in turn
affects the degree of protection the law affords. 13

This concept of know-how applied to industry has been successfully
invoked to address the appropriation problems of innovations as diverse
as applications interfaces in platform information technologies,I4 traditional knowledge generated by indigenous communities, 15 and clinical trial
data. I6 It therefore seems pointless to try to define the subject matter of
trade secrecy laws in any other terms, although we must recognize that this
same' know-how may sometimes also qualify for protection as confidential
information on other grounds and with different policies in mind. I7

See generally id. at 2448-72.
STEPHEN P. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND RELATED RIGHTS: NATIONAL
AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 1616 (1975).
13
Id.atI617.
14 Samuelson and Scotchmer, supra note 1.
15
Jerome H. Reichman and Tracy Lewis, Using Liability Rules to Stimulate
Innovation in Developing Countries: Application to Traditional Knowledge,
in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A
GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 321 (Keith E. Maskus and Jerome
H. Reichman eds., Cambridge University Press, 2005).
16
Reichman, Role of Clinical Trial Data, supra note 5.
17
See generally J.H. Reichman, Overlapping Proprietary Rights in UniversityGenerated Research Products: The Case of Computer Programs, 17 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 51 (1992).
11
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Precisely because we are dealing with investments in know-how applied
to industry as such, and not specified levels of creative achievement, classical
trade secrecy law confers no exclusive property r.ights Whatsoever. Rather, it
provides a legal entitlement to a period of what I have earlier called 'natural
lead time', during which a second comer may reverse engineer the originator's know-how from publicly available exemplars by honest means. 18
Even for products of ordinary manufacture, this period of lead time could
have been relatively long when the industrial revolution first got underway,
although lead times today tend to be relatively short on the whole. 19
Short or long, lead time conceptually enables a first comer to recoup
investment in R&D and to establish distinguishing trademarks that
help to preserve profits against second comers who successfully reverse
engineer the otherwise unprotected know-how. 2o More importantly, the
process of reverse engineering itself, by methodically extracting the innovator's know-how from a given application, tends to generate technical
improvements over time, including cost-saving modes of manufacture
that reduce prices to consumers.21 For example, the ballpoint pen, which
entered the market through jewelry stores at U.S.$70 per piece, is now
available to everyone at 7¢ a piece.
In so doing, trade secrecy law promotes healthy competition by securing investors in innovative applications of know-how to industry against
market-destructive forms of free riding, while simultaneously stimulating
these same third-party competitors to contribute to the technical community's aggregate costs of research and development:
In all cases, liability rules govern in the sense that, without permission, secondcomers may extract and improve preexisting industrial applications of knowhow as long as, in the absence of any contractual agreement to the contrary,
they either defray the costs of reverse engineering or pay the equivalent costs of
having usurped lead-time advantages by improper means. 22

Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 1, at 2439, and n.25.
See J.H. Reichman, Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in
Subpatentable Innovation, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1743, ~ 750-1 (2000).
20 Of course, the second comer may prefer to purchase a license from the originator when the costs and/or the difficulties of reverse engineering appear formidable. See Samuelson and Scotchmer, supra note 1.
21
See, e.g., Leo J. Raskind, The Misappropriation Doctrine as a Competitive
Norm of Intellectual Property Law, 75 MINN. L. REV. 875 (1991); Leo J.
Raskind, The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 and Its Lessons: Reverse
Engineering, Unfair Competition, and Fair Use, 70 MINN. L. REV. 385 (1985).
22
J. H. Reichman, Saving the Patent Law from Itself, in PERSPECTIVES ON
PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 289,293 (F. Scott Kieff ed., Elsevier
Press, 2003).
18'
19
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From these observations, two important Gonclusions follow that merit
further attention. First, the conduct-based liability rules of trade secrecy
law were the primary vehicle for stimulating investment in innovative
enterprise after the i_ndustrial revolution. This conclusion follows because
most innovation consists -of cumulative apd sequential applications of
know-how to industry by routine engineers at work on common technical trajectorie_s. Given relatively high standards of non-obviousness in
patent law, as well as the possibilities for inventing around patel)ts once
issued, most,commercial ventures depended on the conduct-based liability
rules of trade secrecy law (and otht<r unfair competition laws, as well as
trademark law) for opportunities to recoup their investments in R&D.23
In this sense, trade secrecy laws mediated between the strong protection
of patents, when available, and the risk of wholesale duplication (that is,
the risk of zero lead time) in a totally unregutated environment of unbridled copying, as occurred in many developing countries b!'!fore tbe TRIPS
Agreement entered into force.
The second and more far-reaching conclusion is that this classical
system of innovation gave rise to a naturally occurring 'pool oftechnological resources that was openly available to all routine engineers who played
by the rules. ,Because this proposjtiop has attracted insufficient study, it
deserves a closer look here.

III.

A NATURAL OPEN-SOURCE TECBNOLOGY
POOL

The exclusive rights of classical intellectual property law may be viewed
as operating in the space left free by two other regimes tl}at intersect
with them but which are governed by totally different principles. The
three regimes taken together provide a rough map or outline of the classical system of innovation inherited from the industrial revolution. This
scheme is represented in Figure 8.P4 At the top of the diagram, lies the
'upstream' dimension, as it would be called today, in which scientific
and technical knowledge is generated by the public science community,
typically working at universities or other research centers. This basic
research is often funded by government entities (in the United States,
23
See Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 1; Reichman, Green Tulips, supra
note 19. Hence the old saying that intellectual property law provided only 'islands
of protection in a sea of fr~e competition', which is no longer in vogue today.
24
Reproduced and modified from Reichman, Saving the Patent System, supra
note 22, at 292 .
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COMMONS
Basic scientific and technical information

ZONE I
Truly non-obvious inventions
ZONE 2
Routine innovation
small-scale 'inventions')

(i~cludes

ZONE 3
Hybrid regimes
(utility models, etc.)

Applications of know-how to industry
SEMI COMMONS
Traditional trade secrets law

Figure 8.1

Expansion of exclusive rights in lieu of actual or legal secrecy

this would include the National Science Foundation (NSF), the National
Institutes of Health (NIH), or the Department of Energy (DOE)), as well
as by universities themselves, foundations, and even private industry, in
support. of basic research that ca~ lead to downstream applications. 25 In
its most enlightened embodiment, this sphere of activity is one in which
scientific and technical information flow freely as a relatively unregulated
input, governed by the norms of science. 26 Subject to growing pressures
of a legal, technical and ecopoIl).ic nature, the scientific and technical
data and information generated here are, in principle, destined to become
freely available to other scientists in what ideally approximates a true
25
See, e.g., Arti K. Rai and Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole and the Progress
of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289 (2003); Anthony So et al., IS BayhDole Good for Developing Countries? Lessons from the U. S. Experience, 6 PLOS
BIOLOGY 2078 (2008), available at www.plosbiology.orgJarticle/info:doillO.l3711
journal.pbio.0060262.
26
Arti K. Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and
the Norms of Science, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 77 (1999).
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commons, one that has played a fundamental role in our national system
of innovation. 27
It is, however, in the lesser-known domain, deep in the bowels of the
free enterprise economy, where scientific and technical know-how are
applied to industry, that we must focus primary attention in this chapter.
In Figure 8.1, this space is represented as lying under the sphere in which
the exclusive rights of intellectual property law otherwise predominate
(Zones 2 and 3). In this vast space, trade secrecy laws traditionally govern
the productions of routine engineers who develop applications of knowhow to industry without securing patent protection. 28
Within this space, the reverse engineering clause built into the trade
secret paradigm operates as an open ipvitation to third parties to make use
of the first comer's innovative know-how for certain purposes, especially
for devising improvements, or in exchange for compensation. The routine
engineers working on common technical trajectories thus basically constitute an interrelated group that operates under a de facto sharing ethos. As
explained in an earlier article:
[t]hey form a natural, open-source community built around the practice of
reverse engineering and the availability of adequate lead time under the liability
rules governing trade secrets and confidential information. In this endeavor,
routine engineers depend on the reciprocal insights and contributions that the
relevant technical communities derive from the [pooled] domain - the shared
body of knowledge that underlies the common technical trajectories - and on
their inability to remove novel insights and cumulative contributions to knowhow from [that domainj,29

However, unlike the scientific commons depicted 'upstream', the newest
technical knowledge emerging in real time under the aegis oftrade secrecy
laws is typically available to routine engineers only on condition either

27 See, .e.g., Paul David, The Economic Logic of 'Open Science' and the
Balance Between Private Property Rights and the Public Domain in Scientific
Data and Information: A Primer, in THE ROLE OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL
DATA AND INFORMATION IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 19 (Julie M. Esanil and Paul F.
Uhlir eds., NAS Press, 2003); J. H. Reichman and Paul F. Uhlir, A Contractually
Reconstructed Research Commons for Scientific Data in a Highly Protectionist
Intellectual Property Environment, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. STUD. 315 (2003); see
also Michael J. Madison, Brett M ..Frischmann and Katherine J. Strandburg,
Constructing Commons in the Cultural Environment, 95 CORNELL L. Rev. 657
(2010).
28 Reichman, Collapse of the Patent-Copyright Dichotomy, supra note I;
Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 1.
29 Reichman, Saving the Patent System, supra note 22, at 294.
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that they il1vest time, money and effort to reverse engineer the first comer's
know-how from publicly available embodiments by honest means, or that
they negotiate upfront licensing agreements and pay directly to acquire
such unpublished, up-to-date know-how. In this respect, the technical
knowledge generated by routine engineers under trade secrecy laws also
differs from .that generated by patent laws, which enters the public domain
by virtue of disclosure and publication rules. Because the up-to-date,
unpublished knowledge generated by routine engineers is only available to
those willing to defray either the costs of recreating it from scratch, or the
costs of reverse engineering it by honest means, or the costs of licens.ing it,
we are constrained to depict the vast space emerging from their collective
efforts as a 'semi-commons', operating on pay-to-pl,ay principles, rather
than as a true commons or public domain in which everything is freely
available to all comers:
The collective knowledge available from [this semi-commons] ... advances by
dint of the small-scale contributions of single innovators. These contributions
are statist.ically predictable in the sense that they [usually] inhere in what was
already known about existing technical paradigms ... The progressive development of know-how is thus a community project that benefits from the countless
small-scale contributions to the prior art by individuals who draw from [both]
the public domain [and the semi-commons] to make improvements, and who
thereby enrich the [semi-commons] by generating new information that others
in the technical community may exploit to their own advantage. 30

Historically, the legal protection of trade secrets was accordingly
organized around a distinctive class of liability rules that stimulated
competition in subpatentable improvements by discouraging marketdestructive conduct harmful to the relevant technical community as a
whole. This regime did not endow single innovators with any power to
remove their subpatentable or otherwise unpatented contributions from
the semicommons, as exclusive rights would otherwise allow. On the contrary, trade secrecy law's traditional role was to avoid market failure by
enabling entrepreneurs to recoup their investments in small-scale innovation without creating barriers to entry and without impeding qualified
second comers from mals:ing follow-on applications of others' routine
innovations.

30 !d. Here we must concede the possibility that an innovator whose creation
rises to the level of a patentable invention may prefer to remain in trade secrecy
law if the risks and costs of reverse engineering appear very high. See Lemley, supra
note 2; Samuelson and Scotchmer, supra note 1.
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IV.

PROBLEMS OF SELF-REVEALING KNOW-HOW
AND SMALL-SCALE INNOVATION GENERALLY

From Figure 8.1, it becomes evident that the space available for both
common use of 'public scientific and technical information at the top,
and the space available for applications of know-how at the bottom, will
either shrink or expand according to the amount of room occupied by the
exclusive rights regimes on both sides of the circle. Within the circle, in
Zone 1, are innovations that qualify for patent protection as non-obvious
inventions. The size of this space varies with the judicial rigor of the nonobviousness standard, which, until recently, had become relatively low.
In Zones 2 and 3, one finds all the subpatentable innovations that could
not qualify for patent protection under the extant non-obviousness standard but which could conceivably qualify for trade secrecy protection if kept
legally secret within the conditions set by the UTSA.31 Because, however,
lots of valuable ~now-tlOw is borne on or near the face of products distributed in the open market, investors often obtain little or no lead time because
second comers can rapidly duplicate the visible know-how without spending time or money to reverse engineer it from scratch. Legislators increasingly respond to this risk of market failure by enacting sui generis exclusive
property rights in small-scale innovations, such as industrial designs, utility
models, plant breeders' varieties, compilations of data, and the like. As
these 'legal hybrid' regimes proliferate in Zone 3, the natural semicommons
available to all competitors below the circle correspondingly contracts.
No one familiar with my previous work will be surprised to learn that,
owing to a proliferation of hybrid intellectual property regimes, coupled
with an expansion of both the domestic and internatIonal patent and
copyright laws,32 both the science commons and the routine engineers'
technology pool have lately shrunk in a striking and, many would say, a
most alarming fashion. 33 Professor James Boyle has felicitously called this
and related phenomena 'The Second Enclosure. Movement'.34

f,

See, e.g., Robert Denicola, Chapter 2. Robert G. Bone, Chapter 3.
See, e.g., Keith E. Maskus and Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization
of Private Knowledge Goods and the Privatization of Global Public Goods, in
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY, supra note 15, ch. 1.
33
Reichman, Collapse of the Patent - Copyright Dichotomy, supra note 1;
Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 1; Pameia Samuelson et aI., A Manifesto
Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308
(1994).
34
James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the
Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 (2003); see also David Lange,
31

32
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PRESERVING THE COMMONS IN A HYPERPROTECTIONIST LEGAL ENVIRONMENT

In his article proclaiming the virtues of trade secrecy law as an intellectual
property right, Professor Lemley rightly points out that a positive economic effect of this law is to discourage excessive or wasteful investment
in maintaining actual secrecy, which would be necessary in the absence
of the protection guaranteed by the tenets of trade secrecy law itself.35 At
the same time, Professor Lemley dismisses self-revealing innovation that
can be copied without reverse engineering as of little or no consequence,
for the logical reason that, lacking secrecy, it cannot be covered by a law
dedicated to the legal protection of secrets.
In reality, that proposition, despite its apparent logic, remains empirically anachronistic in the sense that worldwide intellectual property law
has rejected it by refusing to condemn what I have called 'incremental
innovation 'bearing know-how on its face'36 to the public domain, where
Lemley believes it belongs. Disregarding the United States, the rest of the
world tends to protect such small-scale, self-revealing know-how under
utility model laws (petty patent law), design protection laws, plant variety
protection laws (also available in the United States), database protection
laws, codified misappropriation laws, and numerous other hybrid legal
regimes. 3? The common' denominator of such regimes is that they protect
small-scale innovations that lack sufficient novelty to qualify for patent
protection and that cannot realistically trigger the secrecy requirement of
trade secrecy law either.
Because such innovation tends to bear its investor's know-how on or
near its face, second comers (not otherwise legally impeded) can simply
extract that know-how by duplicating the products that embody it,
without any corresponding costs or time inherent in the process of reverse
engineering. In the raw state of affairs, the innovator thus obtains zero
lead time in which to recoup his investment in R&D, and the second comer
free rides on the first comer's investment, while avoiding any similar cost

Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (1981); Jessica
Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1996).
35 Lemley, supra note 2.
36 See J.H. Reichman, Computer Programs as Applied Scientific Know-How:
Implications of Copyright Protection for Commercialized University Research, 452
VAND. L. REV. 639 (1989).
37
Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 1, at 2453-504; Reichman, Green
Tulips, supra note 19, at 1753-6; see also Mark Janis, Second Tier Patent
Protection, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 151 (1999).
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structure of his own. 38 The hybrid sui generis regimes seek to rectify these
disincentives to invest by substituting copyright-like or patent-like regimes
of exclusive property rights for the absence of lead time protection under
trade secrecy law. 39
In the United States, instead, where there is officially no utility model
law, the patent authorities periodically lower the non-obviousness standard to the point where the patent law itself absorbs an increasingly larger
share of the small-scale innovations elsewhere covered by hybrid legal
regimes. Thus U.S. patent law protected the paper clip,4o which is the quintessential type of self-revealing functional design that utility model laws
protect in other countries. Indeed, the low non-obviousness standard practiced in the United States until recently means that U.S. patent law periodically operates as a de facto utility model law in many industria.! sectors.
However, a low non-obviousness standard generates high social costs
of its own. It blurs the boundaries between inventions, generating litigation and other high transaction costS.41 More important, it shrinks both
the domain of upstream basic research results freely available to scieI)tists
and the downstream domain of small-scale innovation available to routine
engineers. 42 In response, the U.S. Supreme Court periodically elevates the
standard of non-obviousness, as it recently did in the KSR decision of
2008,43 in an effort to promote the granting of 'quality patents'.
An inevitable consequence of these decisions is that a large swath of
small-scale ip!!ovations, which can readily be duplicated, will fall out
of patent protection, only to receive little or no protection in trade secrecy
law because they will tend to bear their know-how on or near the face of
the products that embody them. Given the predictable outbreak of free
riding likely to ensue, and the corresponding disincentives to invest it
fosters, one should expect both state apd federal courts to push back by
invoking various and often questionable doctrines of uI)fair competition
law, as well as trademark or trade dress laws, which can become even more
anticompetitive than the proliferating hybrid intellectual property rights
under foreign laws. Whether recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions limiting

38
Raskind, Misappropriation, supra note 21; Samuelson and Scotchmer, supra
note 1.
39
Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 1.
40
See Lemley, supra note 2.
41
See Jerome H. Reichman and Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Harmonization
Without Consensus: Critical Reflections on Drafting a Substantive Patent Law
Treaty, 57 DUKE L.J. 85 (2007) (citing authorities).
42
Cj Boyle, supra note 34.
43
KSR Int'l Co. v. Telefiex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
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the use of such ancillary doctrines to supply artificial lead time where
otherwise un~vailable would hold up against this tide,44 should it emerge,
remains to be seen.
In Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu, which. appeared in 2000,45 I argued
that, while it was unsustainable to cast the bulk of present-day small-scale
innovations, with their high front~end costs and ease of duplication, into
a world of zero lead time, it was also wrongheaded to address the chronic
failure of secrecy under trade secrecy law by means of an expanding set of
exclusive property rights that generate overlapping legal entitlements, high
transaction costs, and barriers to entry, all of which seriously diminish both
innovation and the pace of competition. Above all, the greatest long-term
social costs of this flawed strategy are a reduction of upstream inputs into
public science (most dramatically under database protection cum copyright
laws) and of downstream inputs into applications of know-how to industry.
The correct solution to this problem, in my view, is to replace the failing
liability rule of domestic trade secrecy laws, where secrecy keeps diminishing even as the value of vulnerable technical outputs keeps rising, with
a general purpose liability rule that would directly address the market
failure to which incremental innovation bearing know-how on its face is
otherwise susceptible. It is this premise that underlies the 'compensatory
liability regime', first developed in Green Tulips.46 Ideally, its adoption
would render the hybrid regimes of exclusive rights in Zone 3 of Figure 8.1
superfluous and lead to their rt::peal over time.
Under a compensatory liability regime, a small-scale innovator who
operates in Zone 2 would obtain protection against wholesale duplication
for a specified period of time. However, that innovator would also labor
under an obligation to allow second comers to use his or her know-how for
purposes of making improvements, in exchange for a reasonable royalty
to be paid over a specified, but relatively short, period of time. Under this
regime, there is an ex ante entitlement, in tl}e form of an automatic license,
for compensation from follow-on innovators; but there is no possibility of
excluding the second comer from making those improvements. If many
improvers emerge, the first'comer may experience lottery effects from the

44 Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001); WalMart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc. 529 U.S. 205 (2000); Bonito Boats, Inc.
v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
45 Reichman, Green Tulips, supra note 19; see also Jerome H. Reichman, Of
Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in Subpatentable Innovation, in
EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL 1;>ROPERTY 23 (Rochelle Dreyfuss et
al. eds., Oxford University Press, 2001).
46 See Reichman, Green Tulips, supra note 19, at 177-97.
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contributions of his de facto partners, and that same first comer may also
utilize some of their improvements to advance his or her own competitive
position by paying a corresponding reasonable tithe in exchange. 47
I will not delve more deeply into the intricacies of a 'compensatory
liability regime' within the confines of this short chapter on the legal logic
of trade secrecy law. Suffice it to say, this proposed regime attempts to
address the biggest problem facing trade secrecy law today, which is not
its lack of systemic logic, but its growing inability to function in a world
without significant secrecy in important sectors of technological innovation. Absent such an alternative regime, we may expect to witness a continuing unraveling of the trade secrecy paradigm, with mounting aberrations,
such as the ctiminalization of trade secrecy law in the United States48 and
the adoption of an exclusive right to trade secrets in Italy.49 To the extent
that these and other aberrations cumulatively exert a chilling effect on
innovation, we end up more or less where market failures from too milch
free riding would otherwise have carried us in the raw state of affairs.
In contrast, the compensatory liability model seeks to replace a timetested liability rule rooted in secrecy with a portable liability nile covering
applications of knoW-how to industry that is detached from the requirement of secrecy (but not that of a modicum of novelty). It can thus co-exist
with trade secrecy law and allow small-scale innovators two different, but
pro-competitive options. If the innovator chooses the compensatory liability regime, it will provide him or het with more or less the same remedies
as trade secrecy law. It would inhibit wholesale duplication as a dishonest
form of reverse engineering,50 and allow second comers to 'pay' for lessened lead time advantages by investing in improvements of their own and
then sharing some of the resulting profits with the first comer.

CONCLUSION
I will end by noting four additional benefits likely to flow from adoption
of a compensatory liability Tegime for small-scale innovation. First, such
a second-tier regime would actually reinforce the courts' willingness to

For details, see generally Reichman, Green Tulips, supra note 19, at 177-90.
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Trade Secrets: flow Well Should We be Allowed
to Hide Them? The Economic Espionage Act of 1996,9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.], 1(1998).
49
See Ghidini & FaIce, Chapter 6,
50
See Samuelson and Scotchmer, supra note I (analysis of plug mold statutes
in this regard).
47
48

How trade secrecy law generates innovative know-how
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maintain a stiff non-obviousness standard, and dms remove the clutter
that accumulates both upstream and downstream when weak patents are
issued. The existence of a second-tier liability rule would reinforce the
judges' scrutiny of obviousness, by assuring them that those innovations
that fail the test will nonetheless be rescued from wholesale duplication
and free riding forms of market failure (without fostering corresponding
barriers to entry). This could prove to be of particular benefit to the information technology sector, which has been suffocating under the weight of
too many patents, but which seems ever more comfortable witl~ existing
uses of liability rules.
Second, resort to a compensatory liability rule for small-scale innovation should obviate the need for adding more hybrid regimes of exclusive
property rights to Zone 3, where the cumulative social costs are becoming
unsustainable. Third, once set in place, a compensatory liability model
can be adapted to the needs of different industries without damage to
its basic mechanisms Just as the semiconductor chip industry had some
particular understanding about the boundaries of reverse engineering in
the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984,51 so different sectors can
contractually adjust the liability model to their own needs, within outer
limits set by legislators, relevant regulators or industry governance boards
(when an industry voluntarily adopts a liability rule for itselO.
Finally, once a compensatory liability regime becomes a more familiar alternative intellectual property model, it can be adapted to address
numerous problems at the margins that may otherwise seem intractable.
For example, in previous articles, I have tried to show how such a liability
rule could resolve hard problems encountered with respect to traditional
knowledge, 52 clinical trial data,53 and the quest for an acceptable form of
database protection. 54 This regime also has a promising future in supporting the formation of pooled inputs for scientific research where the possibility of downstream applications might otherwise undermine the sharing
norms of science. 55
51
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 (SCPA), title HI of Pub. L. No.
98-620,98 Stat. 3335, 3347 (November 8, 1984) codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-14
(§906 expressly permits reverse engineering); see also Raskind, Semiconductor Chip
Act, supra note 21.
52
Reichman and Lewis, supra note 15.
53
Reichman, Role of Clinical Trial Data, supra note 5.
54 Jerome H. Reichman and Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights
in Data?, 50 VAND. L. R_EV. 51, 145-51 (1997); Reichman and Uhlir, supra note 27.
55
Arti K. Rai et al., Pathways Across the Valley of Death: Novel Intellectual
Property Strategies for Accelerated Drug Discovery, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL'y L. &
ETHICS 1,25-8 (2008); see also Jerome H. Reichman, Tom Dedeurwaerdere aDd
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In this regard, at least one important international treaty concerning
plant genetic resources for food and agriculture has actually embodied
a rudimentary model of such a compensatory liability regime. 56 Efforts
are underway to develop a more refined application of such a regime to
microbial science in order to mediate between the demands of developing
countries for control of their local genetic resources and the needs of the
worldwide scientific community. 57 It also seems likely that liability rules
could play an important role in enabling developing countries to accommodate patented climate-change technologies to their own needs over
time. 58
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Paul F. Uhlir, Designing the Microbial Research Commons: Global Intellectual
Property Strategies for Accessing, and Using Essential Public Knowledge Assets,
ch. 2 (Draft version, February 2, 2011) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
authors).
56
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture,
November 3, 2001, available at www.fao.org/legal/treaties/033f-e.htm; Laurence
R. Helfer, Using Intellectual Property Rights to Preserve the Global Genetic
Commons: The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and
Agriculture, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY,
supra note IS, at 217-24.
57
Reichman, Dedeurwaerdere and Uhlir, supra note 55, chs. 2 and 6.
58
See, e.g., Jerome Reichman, Arti K. Rai, Richard G. Newell and Jonathan
B. Wiener, Intellectual Property and Alternatives: Strategies for Green Innovation,
Chatham House Energy, Environment and Development Programme, Paper No.
OS/03 (200S), available at www.chathamhouse.org.uk/filesI13097_120Seedp_duke.
pdf.

